Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) @ 50

Syllabus Areas:

GS II - Polity and Governance

GS III - Science and Technology

India’s External Affairs Minister, S. Jaishankar, speaking at a conference marking 50 years of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), warned that the world remains under-prepared to tackle bioterrorism and stressed the need to modernise the BWC.

Global Unpreparedness for Bioterrorism

  • Jaishankar stated bluntly that the world is not adequately prepared to handle bioterrorism threats.
  • He highlighted that non-state actors (terrorist groups, rogue organisations) can access and misuse biological agents more easily today due to technological diffusion.

Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)

The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), formally known as the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, is the first multilateral disarmament treaty banning an entire category of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).

It came into force on 26 March 1975

Core Objective

To prohibit the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, and transfer of:

Biological agents

Toxins

Delivery systems
when they are intended for hostile purposes.

Key Features of BWC

  • Comprehensive Ban:
     Prohibits development, production, stockpiling and transfer of biological and toxin weapons, including agents and delivery equipment.
  • Peaceful Use Allowed:
     Permits biological research for vaccines, medicines and scientific work under regulated, non-military purposes.
  • Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs):
     States voluntarily report high-security labs, biodefence programmes and relevant disease outbreaks to promote transparency.
  • No Verification Mechanism:
     Lacks inspection systems, monitoring bodies or compliance checks—its most critical weakness.
Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) @ 50

Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) – Major Gaps

He criticised the BWC for lacking basic institutional mechanisms despite five decades of existence:

  • No compliance system:
    → No structured method to verify whether states are adhering to BWC obligations.
  • No permanent technical body:
    → No specialised institution to assess risks, provide scientific guidance, or coordinate responses.
  • No mechanism to track scientific developments:
    → Rapid advances in biotechnology, synthetic biology, and gene editing (e.g., CRISPR) are happening without global monitoring.
  • These gaps reduce global confidence in the BWC’s effectiveness.

India’s Position & Proposals

India pushed for a more robust system:

  • India has proposed a National Implementation Framework covering:
    • Regulation of high-risk biological agents
    • Oversight of dual-use research (research with civilian benefits but possible military misuse)
    • Domestic reporting obligations
    • Incident management protocols
  • India reiterated its commitment to preventing proliferation of sensitive and dual-use technologies through legal and regulatory systems.

Role of the Global South

Jaishankar emphasized that:

  • Biological threats cannot be managed in isolation—international coordination is essential.
  • The Global South must be central to strengthening the BWC because:
    • It is most vulnerable to biological threats due to weaker health systems.
    • It has a high stake in global access to vaccines and medicines.
    • It can significantly contribute through experience, population coverage, and manufacturing capacities.

Inequity in Health Access as a Security Risk

  • Unequal access to vaccines and essential medicines is not just a development inequality—it is now a global security risk.
  • COVID-19 exposed vast supply-chain imbalances, reinforcing the need for inclusive global biosecurity frameworks.

India’s Vaccine Diplomacy Highlighted

  • Jaishankar recalled India’s vaccine diplomacy during COVID-19 (e.g., Vaccine Maitri) as an example of responsible leadership.
  • It showcased India’s role as a reliable health security partner, especially for the Global South.

Jaishankar’s remarks are essentially a call for serious global introspection. The world is sleepwalking into a new era where biological threats can be engineered, scaled, and deployed far more easily than before. Without institutional strengthening, compliance systems, and a leadership role for the Global South, global biosecurity will remain fragile.

India, through its proposals and experience during COVID-19, is positioning itself as a responsible, capable, and proactive player in the next chapter of global biological governance.