16th Presidential Reference
Syllabus Areas:
GS II - Polity
The 16th Presidential Reference to the Supreme Court of India (SC) is in the spotlight because the Droupadi Murmu-led presidency invoked Article 143 of the Constitution to seek the Court’s advisory opinion on whether judicially imposed timelines for Governors and the President to give assent to state bills are constitutionally valid — a move that follows intense debate over recent state-level bill delays.
Outcome of the 16th Presidential Reference: What SC Said
- The SC unanimously held that courts cannot impose fixed timelines on Governors (under Article 200) or the President (under Article 201) for granting or withholding assent to bills.
- The bench clarified that the concept of “deemed assent” — i.e., automatically treating a bill as approved if a set time passes — is alien to the Constitution. Courts using their powers under Article 142 to provide “deemed assent” would amount to a judicial takeover of the constitutional role of Governor/President.
- However, the SC maintained that indefinite, unexplained, or prolonged delays by Governors may attract limited judicial review. In such exceptional cases, a court may direct the Governor to act — though it cannot set strict deadlines or evaluate the merits of the decision.
- The Court also said that under Article 143, the SC’s opinion is advisory only — not binding — and does not amount to a revision of earlier judgments.
What is Article 143
| Provision | Meaning / Purpose |
|---|---|
| Article 143(1) | Empowers the President of India to refer to the Supreme Court “any question of law or fact … of such a nature and of such public importance that it is expedient to obtain the opinion of the Court.” In such cases, the SC may — after hearing — give its opinion. | Article 143(2) | Allows the President to refer disputes arising from pre-Constitution treaties, agreements, sanads, etc., to the SC for its opinion. | Nature of the Opinion | The Court’s response under Article 143 is advisory — not a binding or enforceable judgment. The President may choose to accept or reject it. |
In short: Article 143 is a tool for constitutional clarity, not a mechanism for the SC to direct constitutional officers or rewrite constitutional design.
Roles & Powers of the Governor vs. President
| Aspect | Governor (State Level) | President (Union Level) |
|---|---|---|
|
Constitutional Position |
Nominal executive head of the State |
Nominal executive head of the Union |
|
Appointment |
Appointed by the President |
Elected by an Electoral College |
|
Term |
5 years, holds office at President’s pleasure |
5 years, removable only by impeachment |
|
Executive Powers |
Executes state laws; appoints CM when no clear majority; can require information from state govt |
Executes union laws; appoints PM; appoints judges, CAG, AG, Governors, etc. |
|
Legislative Powers |
Summons, prorogues state legislature; can address and send messages |
Summons, prorogues Parliament; joint sessions; addresses Parliament |
|
Assent to Bills |
Can: (1) give assent, (2) withhold, (3) return for reconsideration, (4) reserve for President |
Can: (1) give assent, (2) withhold, (3) return except Money Bills |
|
Bill Reservation Power |
Unique power: may reserve a bill for President’s consideration (mandatory in certain cases) |
Acts on reserved bills under Article 201 |
|
Ordinance Power |
Can promulgate ordinances under Article 213 on CM’s advice |
Can promulgate ordinances under Article 123 on Union Cabinet’s advice |
|
Judicial Powers |
Can grant pardons only for offenses under state laws excluding death penalty |
Can grant pardons, reprieves, commutations, including for death sentences |
|
Emergency Powers |
Reports to the President if state constitutional machinery fails (Art. 356) |
Can proclaim National, State, or Financial Emergency |
|
Discretionary Powers |
Limited: e.g., reserving bills, selecting CM when no majority, demanding info |
Minimal; almost always bound by Council of Ministers |
|
Veto Powers |
Absolute & suspensive veto; no pocket veto explicitly but delay possible |
Absolute, suspensive & pocket veto exist |
|
Role in Federalism |
Link between state and union; can influence Centre-State dynamics |
Symbol of Union; guardian of Constitution |
|
Immunity |
Cannot be prosecuted during tenure; enjoys limited protections |
Enjoys full constitutional immunity |
|
Removal |
Removed by President at any time |
Can be removed only by impeachment |
Recent Controversies — Governor Role in Tamil Nadu & Evolution of Assent Time-limits
- Several bills passed by the Government of Tamil Nadu were withheld or reserved by the Governor for years, delaying their implementation. This provoked widespread criticism from politicians, civil society, and the state government.
- In April 2025, a two-judge bench of the SC in State of Tamil Nadu vs Governor of Tamil Nadu intervened — setting rigid timelines (1 month / 3 months) for Governors and the President to act on bills, and introducing the notion of “deemed assent” if time lapsed.
- That judgment sparked debate over judicial overreach, separation of powers, and whether SC could effectively legislate by prescribing procedures absent in the Constitution.
- In response, the President invoked Article 143, leading to the current 16th Presidential Reference. And now — as per the fresh SC bench ruling — the rigid, court-imposed timelines have been invalidated.
- The Court reaffirmed that while governors cannot stall bills indefinitely, the “elasticity” built into Articles 200 and 201 must be respected; courts may at best intervene in “extreme” cases of neglect or mala fide inaction.
In other words, the pendulum swung — from no clarity → rigid judicial deadlines → constitutional advisory reversing the deadlines.
Committees / Precedents on Governor’s Role
Historical experience — and several committee recommendations — have repeatedly flagged the risk of misuse of gubernatorial discretion:
- Earlier jurisprudence (e.g., in the case State of Punjab vs Governor of Punjab (2023)) had held that Governors cannot withhold assent indefinitely, even though no strict deadline exists.
- Committees framed after past controversies have emphasised that Governors are constitutional — not political — heads, and must act on the “aid and advice” of the Council of Ministers, except in rare situations. This ensures democratic Legislature remains effective. (Though the 2025 SC ruling reaffirms the same principle, it stops short of procedural intrusion.)
The present 16th Presidential Reference may well become a constitutional precedent itself — reaffirming the limits of judicial intervention in executive processes, while allowing limited checks against inaction or misuse.
Conclusion
The 16th Presidential Reference and the recent Supreme Court opinion mark a significant moment in India’s constitutional jurisprudence — one that seeks to balance federalism, democratic intent, and separation of powers. While the desire to prevent “pocket vetoes” by Governors resonates with democratic accountability (especially for states like Tamil Nadu), the Court’s refusal to impose fixed timelines respects constitutional design: assent under Articles 200/201 remains a matter of discretion, not mechanical compliance.
However, by preserving limited judicial review for “indefinite inaction,” the SC has kept alive a check on possible misuse — offering a middle path between excessive judicial intervention and unchecked gubernatorial discretion. For future states where executive–legislature tensions arise, this balance will matter profoundly.
